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 | | The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy by David Mayers ISBN-10: 9780195068023 ISBN-10: 0-19-506802-5 ISBN-13: 9780195068023 ISBN-13: 978-0-19-506802-3 Hardcover 1995-04-06 Oxford University Press, USA Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Product Description George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, W. Averell Harriman, William Bullitt, Joseph E. Davies, Llewlleyn Thompson, Jack Matlock: these are important names in the history of American foreign policy. Together with a number of lesser-known officials, these diplomats played a vital role in shaping U.S. strategy and popular attitudes toward the Soviet Union throughout its 75-year history. In The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy, David Mayers presents the most comprehensive critical examination yet of U.S. diplomats in the Soviet Union. Mayers' vivid portrayal evokes the social and intellectual atmosphere of the American embassy in the midst of crucial episodes: the Bolshevik Revolution, the Great Purges, the Grand Alliance in World War II, the early Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the rise and decline of detente, and the heady days of perestroika and glasnost. He also offers rare portraits of the professional lives of the diplomats themselves: their adjustment to Soviet life, the quality of their analytical reporting, their contact with other diplomats in Moscow, and their influence on Washington. Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of American diplomacy in its most challenging area, this compelling book fills an important gap in the history of U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-Soviet relations. Readers interested in U.S. foreign policy, the cold war, and the policies and history of the former Soviet Union will find The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy an intriguing and informative work. | ||
Reviews | ||
Who Needs Ambassadors In A Cold War? "The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy" is one of those books that sounds great in the abstract but somehow stumbles in execution. The basic goal is to tell the story of U.S./Russian relations from the vantage point of the U.S. ambassadors who served at our embassy in Moscow. A secondary aim is to vindicate traditional statecraft as practiced by career diplomats with expert knowledge of foreign countries and languages, who promote the national interest by interpreting foreign trends and finding common ground between governments. Although David Mayers understands the politics and bureaucratics of U.S. foreign policy, his book quickly falls into a rut. It gives the reader a potted history of U.S./Russian relations and offers a series of capsule biographies of ambassadors -- some were talented, others buffoons -- but it never delves deeply into larger issues of policy or smaller issues of embassy management. I'm not sure whether anyone not already well-versed in Cold War history could follow the narrative at points. Huge events like Yalta, the creation of NATO, and arms negotiations are mentioned only in passing, because the U.S. Ambassador wasn't a central player. As Mayer notes, the embassy argued (correctly) that Moscow wasn't bent on war with the U.S., but he doesn't really analyze embassy reporting. Instead, he just rattles off lists of subjects covered in cables. The overall impression is that it didn't matter much who served as the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. With a few exceptions such as Averell Harriman, Llewellyn Thompson and Jack Matlock, our envoys were kept at arm's length by Soviet leaders and marginalized by Washington insiders. Traditional diplomacy was almost impossible between nations like the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet leaders didn't plan to attack the West but they couldn't accept "normal" relations, either, lest this open their country to outside influences. Meanwhile, leaders in Washington distrusted non-political diplomats and too often saw foreign policy as a way to score points with domestic audiences. Both sides were in the grip of fear, ideology, and opportunistic military establishments. With bilateral relations seen as a contest of strength rather than a search for solutions to mutual problems, there was little for Ambassadors and their staffs to do except read newspapers, write cables and work the cocktail party circuit -- and parties were surely few in number in Moscow in the depths of the Cold War! All of this might be grist for a satirical novel about men with big titles and no function -- but I'm not sure that it's the stuff of succesful history writing. I would recommend "The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy" only to specialists or retired foreign service officers. (I'm a serving foreign service officer.) | ||