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 | | Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza by Michael Della Rocca ISBN-10: 9780195095623 ISBN-10: 0-19-509562-6 ISBN-13: 9780195095623 ISBN-13: 978-0-19-509562-3 Hardcover 1996-11-21 Oxford University Press, USA Find Lowest Price |
Editorials | ||
Product Description This first extensive study of Spinoza's philosophy of mind concentrates on two problems crucial to the philosopher's thoughts on the matter: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind's relation to the body. Della Rocca contends that Spinoza's positions are systematically connected with each other and with a principle at the heart of his metaphysical system: his denial of causal or explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. In this way, Della Rocca's exploration of these two problems provides a new and illuminating perspective on Spinoza's philosophy as a system. | ||
Reviews | ||
Excelent This book is a excelent source for those who are studing in Spinoza, the problem of the relations of body -mind(soul) ,their intimate relations and peculiarities.Other questions are also analysed by De Rocca,whith deep and extended attention. | ||
A contemporary look at the mind-body relation in the Ethics Although I think that the identity theory of the mind-body relationship in Spinoza is a highly contentious one, Della Rocca has offered a defence which deserves serious consideration by contemporary Spinoza scholars. His outline of the problem, the relationship between the attributes thought and extension, is one of the clearest and most detailed that is available in recent literature on the subject, and his engagement with the idea that Spinoza is a parallelist [a notion supported strongly by Jonathan Bennett, whom Della Rocca takes issue with in his final chapter] are excellent. Della Rocca also endeavours to highlight the contemporary relevance of Spinoza's mind-body relation, comparing the historical philosopher with philosophers such as Quine and Davidson. Ultimately, however, there is no knock-down proof for the identity thesis, although as Della Rocca presents it, it does appear much more plausible than Bennett's version of parallelism. All up, it is an amazing and in depth examination which provides much fruit for further discussion in this as yet unexplored area in Spinoza scholarship. | ||