The considerable vagueness of the previous phrase, coupled with the abstract character of the language reveals the general tone of this work. It is also worth noting that the author's description of knowledge is little more than a tautology. We know what we know when we can recognize it and articulate what it is that we know. Sure. "My cat's breath smells like cat food" said Ralph of "The Simpsons." Generally speaking, Benson tends to overemphasize the discursive character of knowledge and ignore the necessary, noetic component. After all, how do we know if our articulation of "F-ness" is correct save by looking at "F?" This is one of the overarching problems in the Hippias Major: we can see what is beautiful but when we attempt to articulate why it is so we find ourselves in all sorts of trouble. The main point here being that we can recognize that something is beautiful without needing a definition of beauty (kalos). Once we couple this with his general lack of interest in the dramatic context or dialogical content of the Platonic corpus we have discovered that the author has written 260 pages but said very little.

There are other problems with Benson's reading; far more than would be productive to detail here but I will take one to illustrate my point. Benson leans very hard upon the Apology to justify his contention that Socrates' self-appointed task was in conformity with the wishes of the god of the Delphic oracle. The only problem with this assertion is that it is utterly against the text. The oracle told Socrates (via Chaerephon) that he was the wisest man in Athens. What was Socrates' response? He refused to believe the oracle's pronouncement and set out to disprove the oracle! Now, this may simply be naivete on my part but questioning the gods is not particularly pious behavior. More to the point, Socrates' self-appointed role as gadfly is taken up *against the oracle.* John Sallis makes this point quite nicely in his chapter on the Apology in "Being and Logos." Of course, this is another place where Benson stumbles: his bibliography. Though heavily footnoted (there are literally hundreds) the book contains no reference to works on the early socratic dialogues by Sallis, Tom Pangle, Christopher Bruell, H.G. Gadamer, and numerous others who read Plato with an ear tuned towards the dramatic nuances of the text. The title of this review was taken from a sentence by the literary critic, R.P. Blackmur, who spoke of the early socratic dialogues as full of "imaginative skepticism and dramatic irony." There is almost *no* recognition from Benson that any of this exists within the works. It is, quite simply, a book for a small group of like-minded individuals who are uninterested in letting the dialogues speak for themselves. Needless to say, I cannot recommend its purchase. Put your money towards Diskin Clay's "Platonic Questions" or Newell's "Ruling Passion" which will tell you far more about Plato.