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![]() | Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 by Bernard Williams ISBN-10: 9780521243728 ISBN-10: 0-521-24372-6 ISBN-13: 9780521243728 ISBN-13: 978-0-521-24372-8 Hardcover 1982-01-29 Cambridge University Press Find Lowest Price | |
Editorials | ||
Product Description A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and trivial. Moral Luck contains a number of essays that have contributed influentially to this development. Among the recurring themes are the moral and philosophical limitations of utilitarianism, the notion of integrity, relativism, and problems of moral conflict and rational choice. The work presented here is marked by a high degree of imagination and acuity, and also conveys a strong sense of psychological reality. The volume will be a stimulating source of ideas and arguments for all philosophers and a wide range of other readers. | ||
Reviews | ||
Applicable Ethics I had the good furtune of taking classes from Bernard Williams. In a field where utility formulas and arguments between ethical commitments choke the focal point out of Ethics - the person and their value of living. Bernard Williams brings it back amd makes it a focal point of his thought. After his passing I find his books to be a testament, this one included, to his greatness of thought and humanity. He is very thick to read, but rewards those who are slow and careful with his ideas. A read that with the proper back ground will enrich your understanding and possibly the way you live your life. | ||
I don't know what it would MEEEAAAANNNN! I just don't know what it would mean for moral principles to be relative to one's subjective motivational set. Williams thinks that most of just "just do" have reason to be moral, given our psychology, and that if one does not have the "typical" human pyschology, well, that person has no reason to be moral. THERE IS no reason to be moral. C'mon Bernie, you can do better than that! | ||
Thought-provoking collection of essays on various topics. Bernard (pronounced BER-nerd -- he's a Brit) Williams is one of the leading Anglo-American philosophers of the late 20th century. He has written a number of seminal essays on ethics and personal identity. The essays in this collection include several of his classic pieces. "Persons, character and morality" is an insightul critique of Kantianism in ethics. Williams argues that ethics should not demand of us that we take a completely impartial view of the world. Our own personal commitments and values do, and should, make a difference to how we should act. "Moral luck" makes several challenging suggestions about the inescapability of the role of good luck in justifying some of our decisions. I am tempted to paraphrase one point Williams makes by saying, "The only difference between the genius and the fanatic is that the genius turned out to be right." "Internal and external reasons" is a technical, but very influential, essay. Williams notes that a person sometimes has a reason to do something because she has some motivation that will be served by that action (i.e., an internal reason). He explores whether one can also have a reason to do something when she does not have a motivation that would be served by that action (i.e., an external reason). This is a little abstract. One non-technical way of getting at the issue Williams is discussing in this essay is this: Suppose someone doesn't care about morality. In other words, she has no motivation to act morally. Does she then have any reason to act morally? Some of these essays are a little technical, and may be hard for the general reader to follow. However, many may be enjoyed by any bright person, and I think you can walk away with something from all of them. | ||