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 | | Warranted Christian Belief by Alvin Plantinga ISBN-10: 9780195131925 ISBN-10: 0-19-513192-4 ISBN-13: 9780195131925 ISBN-13: 978-0-19-513192-5 Hardcover 2000-01-27 Oxford University Press, USA Find Lowest Price |
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Product Description This is the third volume in Alvin Plantinga's trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. In this volume, Plantinga examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so. He contends that Christian beliefs are warranted to the extent that they are formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties, thus, insofar as they are warranted, Christian beliefs are knowledge if they are true. | ||
Reviews | ||
"If true, warranted; if not true, probably not warranted..." ...so goes the single thesis of this book, and is the single principle at work in fending off criticisms, from various quarters, of the epistemological propriety of Christian faith. Its five hundred pages are spent not so much in depth of developing this thesis, but in breadth of applying it to a variety of topics. Starting from Kantian and Hickian questions of how to locate the question of warrant with respect to truth, or whether there is a question, Plantinga goes on to tackle, in due course, considerations of justification, deontology, rationality, and such. Following that is a tour of classical Christian conceptions of faith, and discussions of how to locate Plantinga's notion of warrant within the concepts inherited from past thinkers such as Aquinas and Calvin. Finally, some common philosophical and other objections to Christian faith are addressed in light of the preceding. It is the breadth of the topics addressed that makes this book most useful, rather than its depth in argumentation, in which I found a certain amount of repetition in the kinds of defenses Plantinga offers to a variety of criticisms: something along the lines of "But why think *that*?" seemed to crop up most often. In this, as well as other of Plantinga's works, he seems to leave himself open to the charge (that I have in fact heard made) that he's making his job a bit too easy for himself. In particular, what Plantinga leaves out is an explanation of just how *Christian* belief, in particular, is warranted over and above other species of religious belief. What kept coming up in my mind is what I call "The Mormon Problem"--the fact that a subjectively-based defense essentially just like Plantinga's could be given by, say, Mormons, who typically appeal to purely subjective (viz. "a burning in my bosom") considerations in their epistemology. Plantinga does go on to say that a Christian who goes on to consider objections and find them unconvincing retains warrant, but what I'd like to know is just what such objection-meeting considerations have to do with warrant, specifically. Plantinga is consistently vague on what, if any, connection there is. Here's the problem more explicitly: isn't a Mormon who does not admit of the relevance of what might, without too much exaggeration, be called historical and archeological disproofs of The Book of Mormon to their religious epistemology still in qualitatively the same position as a Christian vis-a-vis their faith: "warranted *if* true"? It seems that without begging the question for or against one or the other, a warrant-based account per se doesn't tell us what's different from the two. In other words, I don't see how you can't admit of a certain degree of evidentialism into your religious epistemology without falling into this problem. And whatever intrinsic connection that has with warrant per se, if there is one, needs to be spelled out. That said, I think Plantinga's warrant-based account of faith is probably correct so far as it goes. Finally, I notice a very interesting connection between one of Plantinga's central themes here (if not *the* central theme): that the _de jure_ objection is not, in the end, distinct from the _de facto_ objection. When I hear the way that the crop of militant "New Atheists" like Richard Dawkins (well, he's not so new, just increasingly vociferous) and Sam Harris talk about religious belief, they seem to be coming to basically the same conclusion, in a way, albeit from the opposite direction, as it were. To be sure, these paragons of reason don't so much present arguments as inveigh, pontificate, and bloviate, so they don't state their position as such, but it seems as though they also are saying the same thing, except taking the _de facto_ question as primitive and assumed answered, and then naturally going on to answer the _de jure_ question in like fashion. This would certainly seem to explain their extreme intolerance. In fact, in not explicitly distinguishing between the two, one's dialectic, such as it is, can easily consist in whipping back and forth between the two in a very tight circle. Plantinga's distinction is thus a useful one that can be used to diagnose such argumentative problems in the midst of shrill voices and strongly-worded rhetoric. | ||
Christian Belief Has Warrant. _Warranted Christian Belief_ by analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga is the third book in Plantinga's trilogy on warrant and is perhaps the most important. Plantinga (a theist, Calvinist, and member of the Reformed Church) is perhaps one of the most important analytic philosophers of religion today and is definitely one of the most important theistic philosophers. While this book is the third book in a trilogy, unlike the other books in the trilogy it is longer and more detailed in scope. Further, Plantinga notes that he tries to make the discussion in this book independent of that presented in the previous two books (_Warrant: The Current Debate_ and _Warrant and Proper Function_), but the book obviously follows in the sequence (and also may be considered a sequel to Plantinga's _God and Other Minds_). Thus, this book may be read independently. Plantinga makes the point that this is a work of both apologetics and philosophy, but it is also a work of philosophy of religion, and in particular Christian philosophy. Thus, it will include reference to Christian belief in the same way that a philosophy of physics book would include reference to physics. To begin with it is necessary for Plantinga to explain what he means by Christian belief. Plantinga maintains that Christian belief (or "mere Christian belief") includes two components: the theistic component (that God exists, is a person, and has certain attributes) and the Christian component (that human beings are mired in sin and require salvation, that this was attained through the suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and that Christ is the Second Person of the Trinity). In this book, Plantinga will consider two types of objections to Christian belief - the de facto objections (that Christian belief is false) and the de jure objections (that Christian belief is unwarranted). The de jure objection, "I do not know whether Christian belief is true or not, but I do know that it is unwarranted given modern understandings, etc.", is a common one, but as Plantinga will show there are no de jure objections independent of the de facto objections. An objection that is commonly made to Christian belief is that there is no question at all (that is that the certain attributes of God make Christian belief impossible). This is the objection of Kant (that our concepts do not apply to God), in one interpretation of his thought. It is also the objection of other more modern theologians such as Kaufman and Hick. Plantinga begins by showing that the objection of Kant fails because of certain problems in the so-called antinomies that he presents. Plantinga then turns his attention to claims made by Gordon Kaufman and John Hick, showing the weakness of their claims (and the essential worthlessness of their "theologies"). The question is then concerned as to exactly what is the question of Christian belief. Here, Plantinga begins by considering "Justification and the Classical Picture". Plantinga explains classical foundationalism and evidentialism in the work of John Locke. Plantinga notes how Locke distinguished between opinion and reason and maintained that one should try to live by reason. This implies a deontological understanding; in which, we have a duty to conform our beliefs to reason. Among other things, it is also maintained that certain of our beliefs are "properly basic" and that every belief is either properly basic or derived from beliefs which are. However, the classical pictures runs into difficulties; in particular, it encounters the problem of self-reference, in that there is no easily apparent way for it to justify itself. Plantinga considers some variations on the classical picture (in particular, he notes that Christian belief may be justified in a properly basic manner). Plantinga next considers rationality, and he devotes a considerable amount of space to a discussion regarding William Alston, Christian Mystical Practice (CMP), and rationality (as seen in Alston's important book _Perceiving God_). Plantinga also considers the notion of warrant and the "complaints" of Freud and Marx (others such as Nietzsche are not considered because their "complaints" are regarded as falling into the same category and as being over-the-top and less than rational). The discussion of Freud revolves around the central idea that Christian belief involves the process of "wish-fulfillment". This discussion is particularly funny when the actual theories of Freud are presented (because Freud made some rather absurd claims regarding patricide, among others). The discussion of Marx revolves around the idea that Christian belief results from an unjust society (and is the "opiate of the people"). Plantinga shows how both of these ideas are problematic and how neither of them shows that Christian belief is without warrant. In the next section of this book, Plantinga considers the fact of warranted Christian belief. In particular, he presents what he calls the Aquinas/Calvin model (A/C model) which argues that Christian belief may be properly basic (and relies on a "sensus divinitatis"). Plantinga considers various ways in which knowledge of God may be possible, and his discussion here is heavily indebted to William Alston. Plantinga also notes the role of sin and natural knowledge of God (sin interferes with our knowledge of God). Plantinga also shows that the de jure question is not independent of the de facto question. Following this, Plantinga considers the cognitive consequences of sin. In particular, he shows that sin has noetic effects (in that it may cause the sensus divinitatis to malfunction). Plantinga also considers the case of sin and skepticism (this is the radical skepticism of a David Hume for example) and sin and naturalism. In the case of naturalism, Plantinga provides a powerful probabilistic argument showing that given naturalism and evolution it is unlikely that sense perception will be reliable. Plantinga also considers a rejoinder of this to the effect that the same applies to the theist (the "tu quoque" objection), but he shows that this is not the case provided Christian belief is assumed. In the next section, Plantinga extends the A/C model by showing how faith leads to cognitive renewal (and thus the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis). Plantinga also emphasizes the role of Scripture in the attainment of faith. Plantinga presents a probabilistic argument for Christian belief (relying no the fact of Christ's resurrection), but ultimately rejects this argument, concluding that he does not know a good argument for Christian belief and that such things must be known through faith. Plantinga next considers the testimonial model as well as various objections presented to his model. In particular, Plantinga makes the point that Christian belief is not like a scientific hypothesis (which is the claim of many atheists including the late John Mackie). In the final section of this book, Plantinga considers the possibility of various defeaters for Christian belief (facts we know now which may make Christian belief unwarranted). Plantinga concludes that while none of these defeaters actually defeat Christian belief, that it is possible that such defeaters exist, though they are extremely unlikely. Plantinga considers such defeaters as those presented in modernistic Scripture scholarship (distinguishing between traditional biblical criticism and historical biblical criticism - which may be one of three types: Troelschian, Duhemian, or Spinozistic). Plantinga shows how all of these forms of historical criticism fail to provide a defeater because they disregard the sensus divinitatis. Platinga also considers arguments making use of postmodernism and pluralism. In particular, Plantinga finds that postmodernist claims about truth would provide a defeater for Christian belief if they were true, but that they are in fact self-refuting (Plantinga considers for example Rorty in this respect). Plantinga also shows how claims to epistemic arrogance are also found in pluralism and agnosticism, making the fact of a plurality of religions fail as a defeater for Christian belief. Finally, Plantinga considers the so-called problem of evil (or "problem of suffering"). Plantinga considers both the logical question (does evil contradict the existence of God) and evidential arguments, but he finds all of these to be problematic. The only argument that appears to carry any weight in this respect is a brute appeal to emotion. But, Plantinga shows how this may also be resolved within theism (bringing up in particular the trials of Job). Finally, Plantinga concludes that such objections to Christian belief do not provide defeaters and that there is good reason to believe that Christian belief has warrant. He ends by noting that Christian belief also appears to be true. This book is one of the most important works in modern analytic theistic philosophy. Plantinga's arguments are well-presented and logically rigorous. For those who claim that Christian belief is irrational or lacks warrant given our current knowledge, these arguments presented here are sure to challenge them. | ||
A field manual for effective apologetics I've had this book for several years but never got around to reading it. There was always a commentary or a systematic theology or something that demanded my attention. But I got involved in reading this book while trying to minister to a young guy who was very much romanced by German romanticism (especially Schopenhauer). Plantinga's systematic dismantling of Kant and his followers' position on whether one can know God enabled me to meet his objections. After the first two chapters, the book became a very easy read - in fact, I didn't read much of anything else until it was finished. Analytic philosophy can be horribly dry, but Plantinga has a great sense of humor in this work. It's hilarious in places (see the 'son of Great Pumpkin' argument, his discussion of what the word 'fundamentalist' really means), but well-argued everywhere. I am no philosopher, but having read and understood Plantinga's work, I feel competent to at least present a cogent alternative to some of the most common objectives to the Christian faith. This book is a steal at $30. | ||
Maximally Excellent In WCB, Plantinga repeatedly refers to Alston's PERCEIVING GOD as "magisterial." Alston's book is indeed that. But Plantinga's own work in this volume is that and more. WCB is a philosophically sophisticated defense of even the simplest (and least sophisticated) faith. He challenges a very common objection to Christian belief: "I am not in a position to say whether Christian theism is true or false (who could know a thing like that?), but one thing I do know is that it is not warranted." Plantinga argues, successfully, I think, that this position itself is without warrant. Why? For the simple fact that *if* Christian theism is true, then believers probably *are* warranted even in simple faith. A serious challenge to warrant must therefore include a serious challenge to the truth of the belief. Warrant is whatever, when added to true belief, yields knowledge. And Plantinga carries into the WCB discussion the results of the prior two volumes. A belief is warranted when it is the product of a belief-producing mechanism that is (a)functioning properly (b) truth-aimed, and (c) functioning in the epistemic environment for which it was designed to acquire truth. This account seems to do the best job of making sense of those sorts of basic beliefs that all of us hold without having inferred them from other beliefs. I remember that it rained yesterday. What is my evidence that this memory is reliable? From what more basic and certainly known belief may I infer this? Nothing, really. Indeed, it is logically possible that I was brought into existence by a malevolent cartesian deceiver only five seconds ago, equipped with merely *apparent* memories of yesterday's rain, a particularly happy childhood, and even of having actually typed the beginning of this review (this, too, came into existence partially finished and entrusted to me to complete it). Of course, if I am the victim of such a ploy, then my memory belief is *not* the result of a properly functioning, belief-producing mechanism, and I am not warranted. But I take it that I am warranted in remembering yesterday's rain. In fact, I am not at all on thin ice in saying that I *know* that it rained yesterday. Assuming that (a) it really did rain and (b) my recalling it now is due to the fact that I saw it (or was told about it by my truthful wife, or some other reliable way of knowing) then my memory belief is indeed warranted and counts as knowledge. Suppose that God *does* exist just as believers maintain and that, further, God's presence is experienced in some immediate way. Calvin spoke of a *sensus divinitatus*--a sense of the divine--that was a part of the original cognitive equipment of all humans (and which was damaged when we were collectively dropped on our heads in the Fall). Suppose that faith amounts to a sort of restoration of this faculty. I take in the summer night sky in the South Dakota Badlands and this occasions spontaneous thoughts about God's creative activity. Or I commit some shameful deed and am impressed with the thought that God disapproves of what I am doing. Are such beliefs warranted? According to Plantinga, they are warranted in precisely the way that my memory belief is warranted **IF** they are true. Beyond the notion of the *sensus divinitatus,* biblical Christians believe that the Holy Spirit bears a kind of internal witness, engendering love for God and bearing witness to the Scriptures that they are true. A critic may challenge all such beliefs by alleging that (a) they are held in the absence of anything that looks like evidence and (b) they are readily explained away on some social science explanation. The Freudian explanation of religious belief, for instance, is that it is natural but it is the result of a belief-producing mechanism that is not truth-aimed: wish-fulfillment. But the critic is in a position to know this *only* if he already knows either that God does not exist (which would certainly get in the way of his doing things like creating, disapproving, or bearing witness) or, at least, that God is not, in fact, making his presence known in these immediate ways. In short, the de jure objection that the belief is not warranted cannot be offered apart from the de facto objection that the belief is false. Such criticisms thus beg the question against the believer. In the film, Field of Dreams, Kevin Costner's character, Ray, built a baseball diamond in his cornfield, and ballplayers from the past, including Shoeless Joe Jackson, emerged out of the corn to play. Ray, his wife and their daughter could not only see the players, but carried on conversations with them. Ray's brother-in-law saw nothing and, further, was convinced that Ray and his family had either gone crazy or were pulling some sort of hoax. Suppose, with the plot, that the ballplayers *really were* there, and Ray believed that they were because he perceived them directly, say, through some additional and extraordinary faculty. Given the story and Plantinga's account, Ray is warranted in believing that he is talking to ballplayers. Indeed, he knows that he is. Can he *prove* to his brother-in-law, on the basis of whatever evidence is available to his brotherf-in-law's ordinary faculties? No. But how does this affect the question of whether his belief is warranted? Can I *prove* my memory belief to be true on the basis of some other faculty, such as perception or reason? Maybe not. But must I be able to do so in order to be warranted? Of course not. Why, then, should anyone suppose that Christian believers are warranted in their beliefs only if they are able to infer those beliefs from evidence that is available to ordinary faculties? Plantinga argues along such lines that Christian belief is warranted. Along the way, he takes up discussions of potential challenges to his account. The book opens with a discussion of a view that is prevalent at many divinity schools: that Kant established once and for all that human language cannot refer to God. Gordon Kaufmann offers a rehashed version of this, followed by a rehashed version of his rehashed version. Plantinga's interaction with Kaufmann's work is sheer delight. So is his discussion of John Hick's view of Religious Pluralism, which, as Keith Yandell once quipped, is "in danger of becoming canonical" in religious studies departments. The book concludes with several potential "defeaters" to Plantinga's model for warranted Christian belief. Some argue that the sheer fact of religious diversity strikes a blow. Others press various arguments from evil. Plantinga's discussion of Paul Draper's version is a gem (as is Draper's version itself, to be honest). He also takes on a version of the Great Pumpkin Objection, calling it "Son of Great Pumpkin." The basic GPO is what may well have occurred to you as you reflected on Plantinga's model: *anyone* from *any* perspective can claim that her beliefs are warranted. Even Linus could claim that his belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic and warranted without appeal to evidence. You'll have to read Plantinga for yourself to decide whether this objection sticks. This is a rewarding read, very much worth the effort of 500+ pages. It is also highly entertaining, as Plantinga is a sprightly writer--even when in the midst of the most rigorous argument. I've only recently completed a careful reading of WCB and, as you can probably tell, am still in a sort of "honeymoon period" with the book. Plantinga has persuaded me--a former dyed-in-the-wool evidentialist--that his account of warrant is the correct one. If I think of any telling objections you'll be the first to know. | ||
Tremendous Work in Religious Epistemology Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (WCB) examines the rationality of religious (particularly Christian) belief. WCB is the third and final instalment in the author's trilogy on the issue of warrant. Plantinga is a highly respected philosopher within the realms of epistemology and the philosophy of religion - he is also arguably one of the most significant philosophers of the late Twentieth century. Traditionally, the philosophy of religion has dealt with two broad arguments against religious belief; the evidentiary argument (de facto) and the rational argument (de jure). The de facto approach examines the various arguments (e.g. ontological, cosmological, teleological, revelation and the existence of evil) and makes a probabilistic assessment with regard to the likelihood of a theistic worldview. The de jure approach focuses on the question of whether the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God is in itself irrational. For those familiar with Plantinga WCB is similar to his other writings - characterized by uncommon analytical rigour, moments of clear brilliance and the occasional meander. On the latter point, the author's digression into the views of Jonathon Edwards while well handled added little (from my perspective) except to make a dense tome even more daunting (others may find more value in this aspect). WCB's significance, however, lays it its rigorous examination and counter to the various de jure arguments against Christianity. Indeed, in my view, Plantinga is successful in arguing that there is no compelling de jure argument that is independent of the de facto argument. Several decades ago Plantinga played a leading role in putting to rest the argument that the existence of evil and God were logically incompatible (this argument is now largely centered on a less compelling evidentiary / probabilistic tact). Only time will tell if he is as successful with regard to addressing the de jure argument against Christian belief. All to say that it is a powerful and important work within the field of religion. Overall, I highly recommend the book. Without exaggeration, it is one of the most powerful books I have read (what that says about me I'm not sure). In fairness it is probably of most interest to students of philosophy and theology, however as other reviewers have noted the educated lay reader (especially Christians) can also find great value in it. Note: Some print problems in the book I purchased from Amazon - alternating pages at the back of the book were blank. | ||