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 | | Sameness and Substance Renewed by David Wiggins ISBN-10: 9780521454117 ISBN-10: 0-521-45411-5 ISBN-13: 9780521454117 ISBN-13: 978-0-521-45411-7 Hardcover 2001-09-17 Cambridge University Press Find Lowest Price |
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Product Description In this book, which revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance (Blackwell, 1980), David Wiggins examines the logic of identity, the ideas of substance and change, essence, predication and mortal predication, personhood, and personal memory. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy. | ||
Book Description In this book, which revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance (Blackwell, 1980), David Wiggins examines the logic of identity, the ideas of substance and change, essence, predication and sortal predication, personhood, and personal memory. A substantial new final chapter explores the question of personal identity, arguing that such identity is inseparable from normative requirements that flow from personal memory. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy. | ||
Download Description In this book, which thoroughly revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance (1980), David Wiggins retrieves and refurbishes in the light of twentieth-century logic and logical theory certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past. In this new version, he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism, and then a form of realism that he calls conceptualist realism. In a final chapter he advocates a human being-based conception of the identity and individuation of persons, arguing that any satisfactory account of personal memory must make reference to the life of the rememberer himself. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy. | ||